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FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE SECTION ON EXCISE AND UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION TAXES
This year the Annual Institute of Government which will be held
July 24-26 at the University of Washington is of more than usual interest to attorneys of the State of Washington.
This is so by reason of the fact that included among the various
sections of the institute will be a section on taxation which will deal
specifically, over the three-day period, with the subjects of the Washington State Excise and Unemployment Compensation Taxes.
The Advisory Committee of the Taxation Section, headed by Frank
P. Helsell, has arranged a very instructive program which will be of
great interest to attorneys.
Other sections of the Institute will deal with the subjects of Law
Enforcement, Traffic Control and Safety, Personnel Administration,
Public Library Administration, Planning, School Finance and Public
Health.
The registration fee of two dollars includes admission to all sections
and a copy of the Institute Proceedings. Single lecture coupons are
available: charge, 50c.

COMMENT
THE MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION ACT AS A LIMITATION ON THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE RECORDING ACT
Because motor vehicles are so easily moved from place to place, and
because of the intricacies of successive security transactions in relation
to them, it has become expedient to provide for a more adequate
method of ascertaining the title to any given motor vehicle than the
chattel mortgage recording act provides. In the absence of a title registration act giving the same force and effect to certificates of title for
motor vehicles as that given to similar certificates under a Torrens
system of land registration, in many instances a purchaser cannot be
certain he is buying a clear title without a tremendous amount of search
in the records of several counties, nor can an encumbrancer be certain
of the priority of his lien without a similar search.
Motor vehicle registration acts divide themselves into three groups,
classified as to their effect on later purchasers and encumbrancers of the
vehicle.' In the first group the act is held to be merely a police or revenue
measure and hence to have no effect on third persons dealing with the
vehicle. In the second group the court has held that the effect of the
certificate of ownership is that of a conclusive title instrument, title to
the car not passing until the certificate of ownership is changed. The
change in the certificate being the operative factor in a sale or mortgage,
such sale or encumbrance under this type of statute is absolutely void,
often even as between the parties, until the certificate of ownership is
taken up and changed. In the third group there is a compromise. The
statutes are not clear enough in expressed intention to justify holding
'For comprehensive lists of jurisdictions having these acts and the

classifications into which they fall see Comments (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1238,

at 1246; (1939) 37 MicH. L. REv. 758; and (1939) 28 CALmi.

L. REV. 64.
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the title instruments conclusive, but they are clear enough to justify
a holding that the acts should have more effect than that of a police
measure and should affect in some manner the rights of third persons
dealing with the motor vehicle. In states having this type of act third
parties who rely on the certificate of title may acquire rights superior to
those of prior parties who have failed to conform to the requirements
of the registration act.
The Washington legislature in 1937 passed a registration act for
motor vehicles.2 A portion of this act provides:
"If, after a certificate of ownership is issued, a 'mortgage
is placed on the vehicle described in the certificate of ownership, the registered owner shall, within ten days thereafter,
present his application to the state treasurer, signed by the
mortgagee, to which shall be attached the certificate of license
registration and application shall be upon a form provided by
the director of licenses ... fee of fifty cents (50c). The state
treasurer ... if he is satisfied that there should be a reissue
of said certificates .. . (shall) note such change upon his
records and issue to the registered owner a new certificate of
license registration and to the mortgagee a new certificate of
ownership....
There is little evidence in theact which would tend to show that it was
intended to be a conclusive title instrument act. The penalty provided
for non-compliance is that it is "unlawful for any person to sell or
transfer any vehicle without complying with all the provisions of this
chapter."14 In addition the statute requires that "certificates of ownership when assigned and returned to the director of licenses together
with subsequently assigned reissues thereof, shall be retained by the
director of licenses and appropriately filed and indexed so that at all
times it will be possible to trace ownership to the vehicle designated
therein." 5 But on the other hand there is no provision making the file
and index constructive notice of its contents; no repeal of the chattel
mortgage act as regards constructive notice from a filed chattel mortgage
on a motor vehicle; nor any provision providing that the transaction
will be void if the act is not complied with.
In the recent case of Merchant's Rating & Adjusting Co. v.
Skaug0 the issue was squarely presented to court whether the registration provisions'of REm. Rxv. STAT. § 6312-7 was to be of no effect as
to purchasers and encumbrancers, thus leaving intact the chattel mortgage filing provisions, or whether the effect of the registration act would
be to make the title instrument conclusive and to that extent render
ineffective the provisions of the chattel mortgage filing act as applied
to motor vehicles.
The case arose on the following facts: A owned the car and mortgaged it to B. B recorded the mortgage, but neglected to comply with
'Wash. Laws of 1937, ch. 188, p 782; R1mv P.v. STAT. Vol. 7A, 6312-1 to
6312-14.
'R
BI.lEv. STAT. § 6312-7. See Wash. Laws of 1939, ch. 182, p. 563, for
an amendment of this section involving a slight change in procedure.
'REm. REv. STAT. § 6312-2.
MRa.
REv. STAT. § 6312-6 (d).
6104 Wash. Dec. 67, 102 P. (2d) 227 (1940).
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the provisions of REM. REv. STAT. § 6312-7 (registration act). Then
A sold to C, giving the certificate of license registration to C. C,
exhibiting the certificate of ownership, sold to D the car in question.
D financed the purchase by giving a purchase-money mortgage to
E. B then attempted to foreclose his mortgage by notice of sale. D and
E intervened, removing the proceedings to superior court, and there
contended that REM. REv. STAT. § 6312-7 was intended as a registration
act of the type to make the certificate of ownership a conclusive title
instrument, hence that it superseded the chattel mortgage act as applied
to motor vehicles. B's contention was that the filing of his chattel mortgage was sufficient to protect his interest because it gave notice to third
parties under REM. REV. STAT. § 3782.
With that issue squarely presented, the court had an opportunity to
gave a definitive answer, but chose instead to rest its decision on an
alternative ground, namely, that D and E were the most innocent of the
two parties, and hence as between them and B who made the fraud
possible by not taking up the certificate of ownership, B should be the
one to suffer. There is some precedent in this state for declining to apply
7
a recording statute on the theory of estoppel. The doctrine relied on
an estoppel, rests on the
to
be
stated
not
in
terms
though
the
court
by
same foundation. In effect the basis of the decision is that B made a
representation that he owned no interest in the car, and D and E relied
on that representation to their detriment. However, the court was unwilling to take the next step and hold that the registration act overruled the recording act. Since the facts of the Skaug case are typical
it is difficult to conceive of a similar case arising where the result could
be contrary to the decision of that case."
In the situation presented by the Skaug case it is seen that when a
subsequent purchaser relies on the certificate of ownership and has no
actual notice of the prior mortgage he is protected.' Assume a second
situation in which all factors are the same but the purchaser did not
rely on the outstanding certificate of ownership. In such a case it would
seem that the prior mortgagee's negligence in not taking up the certificate and having it changed would not be the cause of the subsequent
purchaser's loss, and the basis used for holding the prior mortgagee
liable in the Skaug case would be gone. Thus it would be arguable that
the recorded chattel mortgage would give good notice to such a purchaser. It is not clear from the opinion in the Skaug case whether in any
event the registration act must be complied with before the chattel
-Northwestern Finance Co. v. Russell, 161 Wash. 389, 297 Pac. 186 (1931).
'Statutes with language substantially similar to that of the Washington
Act have been held in many instances to be police measures only. Amick
v. Exchange State Bank, 164 Minn. 136, 204 N. W. 639 (1925); Band Lumber
Co. v. Timmons, 82 Mont. 497, 267 Pac. 802 (1928); King-Godfrey, Inc. v.
Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P. (2d) 935 (1932). But a number of courts have
used the same approach as that used by our court in the Shaug case, and
come to the same conclusion. Tharp v. San Joaquin Valley Securities
Corp., 20 Cal. App. (2d) 20, 66 P. (2d) 230 (1937); Comm. Credit Co. v.
McNelly, 171 AtI. 446 (Del. Sup. Crt. 1934); Thiering v. Gage, 132 Ore. 192.
284 Pac. 832 (1930).
OWould the same result have followed if Skaug had relied on the certificate of license registration rather than the certificate of ownership?
Also, some provision should be made to protect other lienors of the vehicle
such as repairmen.
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mortgage on file will give good notice. But it would seem reasonable, in
view .of -the court's express language that they were not limiting the
effect of the chattel mortgage recording act, that in such a situation the
recordation would be good notice.
Assume a third situation wherein the mortgagee does not file his
chattel mortgage at all, but does properly change the certificates of.
ownership and license registration. Would such change alone be sufficient to protect his interest? It would as to a buyer actually seeing the
certificates for he then would have actual knowledge of the mortgagee's
interest and could not be a bona fide purchaser protected by the Recording Act. But can it be said that the requirement for a bona fide
purchaser within the protection of the recording act has been raised to
require that he examine the certificate of ownership? The registration
act sets out the duties of a buyer of a motor vehicle, 10 and it seems that
if a buyer fails to get the certificate of ownership transferred to him the
loss attends his own wrongful act, under the same type of reasoning as.
that employed in the Skaug case. Thus it would be a fair prediction that
should such a case arise the loss will fall on the purchaser. However, it
must be noted that the Skaug case sheds very little light on this particular problem. Should the court hold that the buyer would lose in such a
case, that would do away with the chattel mortgage recording act for all.
practical purposes for a mortgagee would be protected by having the
certificate of ownership changed.
Until the*uncertainty of the effect of the registration act is resolved by
further litigation or by statute a cautious mortgagee should both comply with the registration act and file under the chattel mortgage act.
The solution best fittted to the complex problems in this field would
be an enactment by the legislature of an act making the title instruments conclusive."
JOHN M. DAVIS..

2Rxa. REv. STAT. § 6312-6.

2'Under such a statute probably it would be appropriate to have the
certificate of ownership convey more information about the true condition

of the title, showing mortgagor as owner and including the material
facts of the mortgage thereon. Some provision should be made for other
lienors of the vehicle, such as repairmen, to protect their liens on the
vehicle..

